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Yuan Yang

LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL SPILL
ACCIDENTS: INTERNATIONAL REGIME AND ITS
IMPLEMENTATION IN CHINA
ABSTRACT
Marine oil spill accidents have long been caused by ship
collisions. However, the proliferation of offshore oil and gas
installations portends a marked increase in oil spills from these
sources. This presents a unique enforcement challenge for
international and Chinese domestic systems for oil pollution
liability and compensation that were developed in response to the
threat of ship-based oil pollution. This article focuses on how the
international liability and compensation regime for oil pollution
has been implemented in China, and whether a combination of
the international regime and domestic Chinese regulations could
provide an adequate mechanism for holding offshore oil
operators liable for accidents and for ensuring adequate
compensation to injured parties. Analysis of Chinese law
demonstrates that the current international liability and
compensation regime for oil pollution, the 1992 Civil Liability
Convention (CLC)–International Oil Pollution Compensation
(IOPC Funds), has been only partially implemented in China and
lacks domestic adaptation mechanisms. The CLC–IOPC Funds
regime also does not extend to oil pollution accidents resulting
from offshore operations. An international convention containing
universal liability provisions for offshore oil spill accidents
would require a long-term process of joint international efforts.
Based on this international and domestic Chinese legal
environment, this article concludes that China should first
develop a domestic liability and compensation mechanism that
implements the international regime for ship-source oil pollution
in its entirety, but which also extends to pollution caused by
offshore oil spills.
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INTRODUCTION
Historically, shipping accidents have been a major source of the world’s
oil spills.1 This reality has significantly impacted the development of the current
international regime on liability and compensation for oil pollution through the
efforts of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 2 The regime is
comprised of a series of conventions3 adopted pursuant to the IMO’s objective of
keeping the shipping industry safe and clean. 4 Considered together, these
conventions establish a liability and compensation framework for ship-source oil
pollution, which was adopted and implemented by signatory states.5 However, in
its current form, the regime does not extend to non-ship-source oil pollution, which
poses a significant challenge both to assigning liability to offshore oil and gas
operators and to compensating parties suffering damages as a result of pollution
caused by offshore oil and gas operations.
There have been several attempts by international and governmental
agencies to establish a unified liability regime for pollution damage from offshore
oil and gas operations. Due to disagreement over the definition of “ship,” early
attempts comprised only exploratory discussions without establishing a unified
regime.6 As offshore drilling increases and moves into deep waters, catastrophic

1. See Laura Moss, The 13 Largest Oil Spills in History, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (July 16,
2010),
http://www.mnn.com/earth-matters/wilderness-resources/stories/the-13-largest-oil-spills-inhistory [https://perma.cc/3PS5-28VR].
2. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the United Nations specialized agency with
responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships.
Maritime safety was considered to be the IMO’s most important responsibility. In 1967, the Torrey
Canyon accident occurred, with 120,000 tonnes of oil being spilled, which draw the IMO’s attention to
the growth in the amount of oil being transported by sea and in the size of oil tankers. After that, a series
measures were gradually designed to prevent and compensate tanker accidents, including the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 34 U.S.T. 3407,
1340 U.N.T.S. 184, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29,
1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, 9 I.L.M. 45, and the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, 11
I.L.M. 284. The latter two conventions originally established the international liability and
compensation regime for oil pollution. See Brief History of IMO, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org
/en/About/HistoryOfIMO/Pages/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/U7G2-7GAX].
3. The majority of conventions adopted under the auspices of IMO or for which the Organization
is otherwise responsible, fall into three main categories. The first group is concerned with maritime
safety; the second with the prevention of marine pollution; and the third with liability and compensation,
especially in relation to damage caused by pollution. Outside these major groupings are a number of
other conventions dealing with facilitation, tonnage measurement, unlawful acts against shipping and
salvage, etc. In the context of the liability and compensation regime for oil pollution, “a series of
conventions” mainly refer to: the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
supra note 2; the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 2; and the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, Mar. 27, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 1493 (entered into force Nov. 21,
2008), and the amendments of the three conventions. See Introduction to Conventions, INT’L MAR.
ORG., http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/EFE3-9GAX].
4. U.N. Convention on the International Maritime Organization art. 1, opened for signature Mar.
6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, 289 U.N.T.S. 48 (entered into force Mar. 17, 1958).
5. See Introduction to Conventions, supra note 3.
6. See infra Table 2, Part II.C.
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accidents in offshore operations 7 are occurring more frequently and pose a
significant global environmental and human health risk. Except for some private
laws and regional agreements, few liability and compensatory rules universally
apply to pollution damage from major offshore accidents, including marine
transboundary pollution.8
China, as a country that has long engaged in both shipping and offshore
industries, has confronted frequent oil spill accidents in its territory, within the
boundaries of its territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ),9 and continental
shelves, as well as on the high seas. In the face of ship-source oil pollution, China
has adopted and partially implemented a series of IMO Civil Liability and Fund
conventions.10 The implemented conventions chiefly apply to persistent oil spills
from tankers and bunker oil pollution damage in China.
As a mechanism for compensating those adversely affected by oil
pollution not covered by the IMO conventions in force in China, a domestic
liability fund regime for oil pollution was established in 2015. 11 However, this
regime does not extend to oil pollution from offshore operations, and total domestic

7. For example, the 2009 Australia Montara oil spill; 2010 US Deepwater Horizon oil spill; 2011
China Bohai Bay oil spill; and 2012 Brazil Frade oil spill.
8. One example here is the 1975 Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL), which is not an
international convention but a private agreement between 16 operators in the offshore sector. This
Agreement was initially an interim measure to provide a strict liability regime whilst awaiting the entry
into force of a regional Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage resulting from
Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources (CLEE), a regional convention for the
Baltic, North Sea, and North Atlantic areas. The Convention was, however, never ratified by any of the
nine states that participated in the Diplomatic Conference which adopted the Convention and it has
never come into force. However, OPOL continues to operate and imposes strict liability on operators of
offshore facilities and guaranteed payment of compensation up to a limit currently set at US $ 250
million per incident. The parties to OPOL are 16 operators of offshore facilities within the jurisdiction
of any of the “Designated States” to the Agreement which are UK, Denmark, Germany, France,
Republic of Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Isles of Man, Faroe Islands and Greenland. COMITÉ MAR.
INT’L, OFFSHORE ACTIVITIES: POLLUTION LIABILITY AND RELATED ISSUES, http://www.comitemaritime
.org/Uploads/Work%20In%20Progress/Offshore%20Activities/Offshore%20activities-pollution%20and
%20related%20issues-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NUU-CCHR].
9. The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject
to the specific legal regime established in Part V of the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS), under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms
of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention. The EEZ shall not extend
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea, art. 56, 57, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994).
10. This mainly refers to Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution, Nov. 27, 1992, 1956 U.N.T.S. 255 (entered into force May 30, 1996) (amending
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3);
Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, Nov. 27, 1992, 1953 U.N.T.S. 373, 35 I.L.M. 1406
(entered into force May 30, 1996); International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution
Damage, supra note 3.
11. Maritime Bureau, China Ship Oil Pollution Compensation Fund Management Committee was
Established, NEWS OF THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (June 19,
2015), http://www.moc.gov.cn/zizhan/zhishuJG/haishiju/guanlipindao/gongzuodongtai/201506/t201506
19_1837359.html [https://perma.cc/ES5K-2E45].
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compensable oil pollution damages are much lower than that under the
international system.12 For offshore oil spill damages, there are only basic rules in
China’s Marine Environmental Protection Law (MEPL)13 and Tort Law,14 which
do not form a unified liability regime. As a result of these inadequate compensation
criteria and holes in domestic law, mechanisms for compensating ship-source and
offshore oil pollution are insufficient in China.
The aim of this article is threefold. First, it examines the international
regime on liability and compensation for oil spill accidents. This examination
reveals a gap in the international regime, which lacks provisions addressing oil spill
pollution caused by offshore oil and gas operations. Second, this article introduces
the Chinese framework for liability and compensation for oil spill accidents. This
discussion also addresses how the international liability and compensation regime
for oil pollution has been implemented in China. Third, it further explores whether
the implemented international regime and the Chinese system of oil pollution
liability and compensation are applicable to offshore oil spill damages in China.
In this respect, the article is structured as follows. Part I provides a
historical overview of major oil spill accidents and discusses the nature of the
damage caused by accidents in shipping and offshore industries. Part II reviews the
international regime on liability and compensation for oil spill accidents, including
the development of international law on ship-source oil pollution and the attempts
to establish a unified convention for pollution from offshore operations. Part III
analyzes the implementation of the international liability and compensation regime
for oil spill accidents in China. In comparing criteria for oil pollution under
Chinese law and international conventions, this section also discusses why China
has not fully implemented the 1992 CLC–IOPC regime, and the increasing
challenges arising from the legal gap in the Chinese system concerning assigning
liability and providing compensation. The article concludes by arguing that China
should endeavor to fully implement the 1992 CLC–IOPC Funds regime, and
proposing that a unified domestic liability-fund regime should be extended to the
pollution damage caused by offshore oil spill accidents.
I. OIL SPILL ACCIDENTS
A. Overview
“Oil spill accident” usually refers to unexpected and heavy releases of oil
with the potential of causing significant economic loss, personal injury, or
environmental damage.15 These accidents are chiefly caused by human activities
(e.g., oil drilling, manufacturing, storage, transportation, and waste management)
and come in conspicuous forms such as well blowouts, pipeline breaks, and ship

12. See infra Table 5, Part III.B.
13. Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, rev’d Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000).
14. Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010).
15. See Oil Spill Accidents, LAWS, http://accident.laws.com/oil-spills [https://perma.cc/3ZU3MD5C].
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collisions or groundings.16 Since the 1970s, numerous oil spill accidents have been
recorded worldwide; they are less frequent than operational oil spills but involve a
high percentage of total spilled volume.17 The recorded spills mostly occurred in
marine transportation and offshore oil and gas operations, especially in cases where
an oil tanker broke up in heavy seas or a disaster occurred at an offshore oil
platform.
B. Major Accidents in Shipping and Offshore Industries
Over time, the source of oil spill accidents in the industry has shifted from
shipping accidents to accidents occurring during offshore oil extraction and
conveyance. 18 Ship-source oil spills account for a large amount of marine oil
pollution between 1970 and 2010. However, the quantity of ship-source oil spilled
per year during that same period has seen a reduction from 314,000 tons in 1970 to
21,000 tons in 2000.19 This reduction may be closely related to the use of pipelines
for transporting petroleum products,20 safer and structurally-improved tankers, and
improved ship traffic control.21 In addition, whereas the number of pipeline spills
per decade has increased dramatically since the 1970s, only a few very large
offshore accidents—such as the Ixtoc I and Deepwater Horizon oil spills—account
for a larger volume of oil spilled. Indeed, spillage figures for a particular year may
be severely distorted by a single large accident.22
Over the past decade, accidents on offshore oil platforms have led to
dramatic pollution damage. However, except for widespread media coverage of
four recent major offshore accidents (Australia, 2009; United States, 2010; China,
2011; Brazil, 2012),23 worldwide sharing of information concerning the safety of
offshore oil extraction operations is limited. As offshore oil and gas operations
move from shallow coastal areas to deep waters (over 500 meters below sea level),
poor information sharing undoubtedly breeds difficulties in remediating damaged
areas when extreme accidents occur. In contrast, statistics for tanker accidents are
available worldwide and comprehensively calculated each year. This service is
offered by the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF) 24 and
16. RISK GOVERNANCE OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS 1 (Preben Hempel Lindøe eds.
2014).
17. Most spills from tankers result from routine operations such as loading, discharging, and
bunkering which normally occur in ports or at oil terminals, while larger spills tend to result from
accidental causes such as collisions and groundings. See INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N
LTD., OIL TANKER SPILL STATISTICS 2015, at 2 (2016), http://www.itopf.com/fileadmin/data/Documents
/Company_Lit/Oil_Spill_Stats_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4XY-JL55].
18. Arne Jernelöv, How to Defend Against Future Oil Spills, 466 NATURE 182, 183 (2010).
19. Id. at 182–183.
20. Michael A. de Gennaro, Oil Pollution Liability and Control Under International Maritime Law:
Market Incentives as an Alternative to Government Regulation, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 265, 274
(2004).
21. Jernelöv, supra note 18.
22. Id. at 183.
23. See supra note 7.
24. The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF) was established in 1968 in the
wake of the Torrey Canyon oil spill. Its original function was the administration of an oil spill
compensation scheme. During the 1970s, ITOPF developed its technical services function and
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provides a successful model for the development of a database for offshore
accidents that a non-profit organization, like ITOPF and others interested in
monitoring and evaluating offshore accidents, should work toward.
C. Damage Caused by Oil Spill Accidents
The damages suffered by those adversely affected by an oil spill include
personal injury, property damage, economic loss, and environmental damage. The
first three damages together are regarded as “traditional damage[s]”25 and usually
trigger the application of international civil liability conventions. However,
environmental damage, and particularly “pure environmental damage” or
“ecological damage,” is seldom cited as the sole basis for liability.26
For example, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage defines “pollution damage” as:
(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination
resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship,
wherever such escape or discharge may occur, provided that
compensation for impairment of the environment other than loss
of profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of
reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to
be undertaken;
(b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage
caused by preventive measures.27
This definition of oil pollution reflects the policy position of most oil spill
liability treaties currently in force, i.e., to impose liability upon oil and gas
operators for property and economic loss resulting in damage to the environment,28
but not to impose liability for damage inflicted upon the environment per se. In
particular, this definition is unsatisfactory because it does not state explicitly what
types of damages are compensable under the convention. With respect to
environmental damage, the compensable aspects are limited to removal of
hazardous substances and “reinstatement” of the environment. It should also be
noted that this definition does not contain a mechanism for compensation for
unrecoverable damage to the environment itself. However, being the first of its
established a team of well qualified scientists able to offer around the clock technical support to tanker
owners, their P&I insurers and other groups. ITOPF has been providing its key service of emergency
response to tanker owners since the 1970s. From 1999 this service was formally extended to the owners
of other types of ship as well. See Our History, INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N LIMITED,
http://www.itopf.com/about-us/our-history/ [https://perma.cc/R9AW-QB9P].
25. This definition occurs in the introduction to Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament
and of the Council of April 21, 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and
remedying of environmental damage. See Introduction, Environmental Liability, EUR. COMMISSION:
ENV’T, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/ [https://perma.cc/G3VF-HW9P].
26. 6 ALENA DOUHAN, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, LIABILITY
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 830 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed. 2013).
27. Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, supra note 10, 1956 U.N.T.S. at 285–86.
28. MICHAEL BOWMAN & ALAN BOYLE, ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW 156 (2002).
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kind, this definition has substantially influenced the concept of environmental
damage in most subsequent international liability regimes.
In practice, the extent of damages resulting from a given oil spill depends
on a wide range of factors, including the particular characteristics of the spill.29
Compared with light oils, highly persistent oil—such as heavy fuel oil or heavy
crude—is more likely to cause widespread damage in the intertidal zones of
shorelines through smothering, which usually occurs in major oil spill accidents.30
Therefore, both international and domestic liability regimes for oil pollution
usually divide spilled oils into categories of persistent oil and non-persistent oil
spills, 31 and the compensation criteria for oil pollution damage are established
based on the quantity of oil released in a given case.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME ON LIABILITY AND
COMPENSATION FOR OIL ACCIDENTS
A. Liability and Compensation for Ship-Source Oil Pollution
Historically, ship-source oil spills have caused considerable amounts of
damage; this reality stimulated the development of international conventions for
governing and managing oil pollution. These conventions are focused in their scope
and drafted to apply to spills based on the source of the spill and type of oil spilled
in a given case (see Table 1 below). Together, these conventions aim to establish a
unified liability regime and mechanisms for providing adequate compensation to
parties affected by oil pollution.
TABLE 1. International liability and compensation regime for oil pollution in shipping
activities
Type of
Pollution
Persistent oil
pollution

Year

Convention

1969 /
1992

International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage

1971

International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution
Damage

Persistent oil
pollution

1996

International Convention on Liability and Compensation
for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous
and Noxious Substances by Sea

Hazardous and
noxious
substances

2001

International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil
Pollution Damage

Bunker oil
pollution

29. See INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N LTD., EFFECTS OF OIL POLLUTION ON THE
MARINE ENVIRONMENT: TECHNICAL INFORMATION PAPER 13 (2014), http://www.itopf.com/file
admin/data/Documents/TIPS%20TAPS/TIP13EffectsofOilPollutionontheMarineEnvironment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MS3-QCSE].
30. Id. at 3.
31. “[P]ersistent oils generally contain a considerable proportion of heavy fractions or high-boiling
material such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil.” In contrast, “non-persistent oils
are those that are generally of a volatile nature and are composed of lighter hydrocarbon fractions,
which tend to dissipate rapidly through evaporation.” CARYN ANDERSON, INT’L TANKER OWNERS
POLLUTION FED’N LTD., PERSISTENT VS NON-PERSISTENT OILS: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 1–2
(2001), http://www.itopf.com/fileadmin/data/Documents/Papers/persistent.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9Z96J8C].
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The original liability and compensation regime for oil pollution is set forth
in the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
(CLC) 32 and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1971 Fund).33 In
1967, an accident involving the oil tanker Torrey Canyon caused 120,000 tonnes of
crude oil to escape, causing major damage to the coastline and wildlife in the
vicinity of Southern England and Northern France. 34 This accident led to the
establishment of the 1969 CLC, which provided strict liability and compulsory
insurance for “[oil] pollution damage.”35 After that, the 1971 Fund was created as
an additional compensation mechanism for “pollution damage[s]” that exceed the
liability limitation under the 1969 CLC. The ceiling for compensation thus reached
60 million SDR36 (84 million USD in 2016 terms) per incident, which included the
amount paid under the 1969 CLC.37
In 1992, two protocols amended the old regime (the 1969 CLC–1971
Funds regime), thus formulating the 1992 Civil Liability Convention (1992 CLC)38
and the 1992 Fund Convention (1992 Fund). 39 The amended CLC and Fund
convention established a new regime that, for all practical purposes, inherited the
old liability and compensation framework for ship-source oil spills,40 but provided

32. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 2.
33. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for
Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 2.
34. See Brief History of IMO, supra note 2; see also Moss, supra note 1.
35. “‘Pollution damage’ means . . . loss or damage caused outside the ship carrying oil by
contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or
discharge may occur,” and includes “the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused
by preventive measures.” Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 10, 1956 U.N.T.S. at 285–86.
36. “The Protocol of 1976, which entered into force in 1981, provided for the applicable unit of
account used under the convention to be based on the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) as used by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), replacing the ‘Poincaré franc,’ based on the ‘official’ value of gold,
as the applicable unit of account.” International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/InternationalConvention-on-Civil-Liability-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(CLC).aspx [https://perma.cc/V9MJ-J9QP].
37. The unit of currency in the CLC and its Fund Conventions is the Special Drawing Right (SDR)
as defined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this article, to clearly compare the
compensation standards between international conventions and Chinese legislations, the SDR has
converted into U.S. dollars at the rate applicable on July 1, 2016 (1 SDR=US$1.395960). See SDR
Valuation, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx [https://
perma.cc/4RN9-CYET].
38. See Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, supra note 10.
39. See Protocol of 1992 to amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, supra note 10.
40. The 1969 CLC applied to any persistent oil such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil,
lubricating oil, and whale oil, whether carried on board a ship as cargo or in bunkers of such a ship;
whereas oil in the 1992 CLC means any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil (excluded whale oil),
whether carried on board a ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such a ship. See International Convention
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 2, 973 U.N.T.S. at 5; see also Protocol of 1992
to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 10, 1956
U.N.T.S. at 285.
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much higher limits of compensation.41 In 2003, a protocol to the 1992 Fund—the
2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol—was adopted that further increased the
maximum potential compensation for a given spill. 42 Membership in the
Supplementary Fund is optional and any member state of the 1992 Fund may join
the Supplementary Fund.43 The 1992 Fund and the Supplementary Fund together
constitute the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds),
which gradually developed into two intergovernmental organizations providing
compensation for oil pollution damages resulting from tanker spills of persistent
oil.44
Although the 1992 CLC–IOPC Funds is a compensation regime for oil
pollution resulting from tankers, this regime is limited in its scope, only covering
pollution damage arising from spills of persistent oil from tankers. It does not
provide compensation for other types of oil spills in maritime transportation, such
as non-persistent oil (e.g. gasoline, light diesel oil, kerosene) or oils from other
types of substances (e.g. chemicals, liquefied gases or noxious liquid substances),
nor does it cover spills occurring during offshore extraction activities. In other
words, when pollution damages derive from a source other than maritime transport
or are not caused by persistent oil, the related accidents are not compensable
through the 1992 CLC–IOPC Funds regime.
To address non-persistent oil spills, as well as spills involving other
substances, the International Marine Organization (IMO) developed the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2001
(Bunker Convention) 45 and the International Convention on Liability and
Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and
Noxious Substance by Sea (HNS Convention).46 The Bunker Convention provides
a framework for liability and compensation for bunker oil47 pollution caused by all
categories of sea-going vessels other than oil tankers. It is closely modeled after the
1992 CLC, which imposes upon ship owners strict, but limited, liability for
41. Article 6(1) of the 1992 CLC Protocol is amended as follows: a. the reference to “3 million
units of account” shall read “4,510,000 units of account”; b. the reference to “420 units of account” shall
read “631 units of account”; and c. the reference to “59.7 million units of account” shall read
“89,770,000 units of account.” See Adoption of Amendments of the Limitation Amounts in the Protocol
of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, Oct.
18, 2000, IMO Doc. LEG 82/12, annex 2, at 2 [hereinafter Adoption of the Amendments of the
Limitation Amounts].
42. Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, May 16, 2003, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF 14/20
(entered in force Mar. 3, 2005).
43. INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR
COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: EXPLANATORY NOTE 6 (2015) http://www.iopcfunds.
org/fileadmin/IOPC_Upload/Downloads/English/explanatory_note.pdf [https://perma.cc/E29P-CS3C]
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE].
44. Id.
45. International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 3.
46. International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1406.
47. “Bunker oil” means any hydrocarbon mineral oil, including lubricating oil, used or intended to
be used for the operation or propulsion of the ship, and any residues of such oil. See International
Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 3, art. 1.5.
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pollution damages. This strict liability provision is coupled with a compulsory
insurance requirement provision establishing a claimant’s right of action against the
insurer. The HNS Convention is also modeled after the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund
Convention, and was adopted in 1996 to complement the CLC–IOPC Fund regime
by providing compensation to victims of accidents involving a wide range of
hazardous and noxious substances, including bulk cargoes (solids, liquids including
oils, and liquefied gases) and packaged goods.48
B. The 1992 CLC–IOPC Funds Regime
The 1992 CLC–IOPC Funds regime creates a three-tier system to
effectively compensate for oil spill damages in shipping activities. Under this
regime, the following compensatory damages are available to parties injured as a
result of an oil spill:






cleanup costs and preventive measures;
property damage;
economic loss
o to fisheries, mariculture, and fish processing sector,
o in the tourism sector;
measures to prevent pure economic loss; as well as
environmental damage and post-spill studies.49

Regardless of the flag state of the tanker and the nationality of the ship owner, the
regime covers oil spills that occur in a member state’s territory, territorial sea, or
EEZ or equivalent area.50
The 1992 CLC is the first tier of compensation. It imposes strict liability
on ship owners in the context of accidental oil spills whereby a ship owner is liable
for pollution damage caused by its tanker regardless of fault.51 A ship owner is also
entitled to liability limitation, based on gross ship tonnage, 52 in the maximum
amount of 89.77 million SDR (125.32 million USD). However, a ship owner will
be deprived of this right to limited liability “if the damage resulted from the
48. See International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, supra note 46, at 1415–16.
49. INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, 1992 FUND CLAIMS MANUAL: OCTOBER 2013
EDITION 6, 24–40 (2013) http://studylib.net/doc/18511180/claims-manual [https://perma.cc/L9667EKR].
50. INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, supra note 43, at
2.
51. There are a limited number of exceptions for strict liability, including where (a) the damage
resulted from an act of war or a grave natural disaster; (b) the damage was wholly caused by sabotage
by a third party; and (c) the damage was wholly authorities in maintaining lights or other navigational
aids that the damage resulted from. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, supra note 2, 973 U.N.T.S. at 5.
52. Monetary limit of liability of 1992 CLC is based on ship gross tonnage (GT): ≦5000 GT, 4.51
million SDR; 5,000–14,0000 GT, 4.51 million SDR plus 631 SDR for each GT; > 14,0000 GT, 89.77
million SDR. The ship owner’s insurer will be entitled to the same limits as the ship owner. See
Adoption of the Amendments of the Limitation Amounts, supra note 41; see also Protocol of 1992 to
Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 10, at 287.
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owner’s personal act with the intent to cause such loss or recklessly and with
knowledge that such damage would probably result.”53
In order to ensure that compensation claims against a ship owner are not
frustrated by insolvency, the 1992 CLC also established compulsory insurance
requirements. In particular, owners of ships registered in member states carrying
more than 2000 tons of persistent oil as cargo must maintain insurance or other
financial security to cover their liability for potential pollution damages.54 Similarly
registered ships must carry a certificate on board attesting to the insurance
coverage. These insurance certificates must also be carried aboard ships not
registered in a member state but that navigate seas under the jurisdiction of a party
to the 1992 CLC.55 In addition, claims for pollution damages under the 1992 CLC
must be brought directly against a registered ship owner, the insurer, or other
person providing financial security for the owner’s pollution damage liability.56
The second tier of protection provided by the 1992 Fund is triggered when
a state party victim does not obtain sufficient compensation under the 1992 CLC
for one of the following reasons:57




the ship owner is
o exempt under the 1992 CLC because it can invoke one of the
exemptions under that convention,58 or
o financially incapable of meeting its obligations under the 1992
CLC in full and its insurance is insufficient to satisfy the claims
for compensation; or
the damage exceeds the ship owner’s maximum liability under the 1992
CLC.

The 1992 Fund complements the 1992 CLC, and also regulates the limited
circumstances in which the Fund is not triggered (for example, where the pollution

53. See Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, supra note 10, at 287–88.
54. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 2, 973
U.N.T.S. at 7; see also Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 10, at 289.
55. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 2, 973
U.N.T.S. at 7; see also Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 10, at 289.
56. INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, supra note 43, at
10.
57. Id. at 23.
58. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 2, 973
U.N.T.S. at 5.
No liability for oil pollution damage shall attach to the owner if he proves that the
damage: (a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, or (b) was wholly
caused by an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by a third part, or (c)
was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any Government or
other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational aids in
the exercise of that function.
Id.
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damage “resulted from an act of war,”59 or where the claimant “cannot prove that
the pollution damage resulted from an incident involving one or more ships, as
defined in the Convention” 60 ). In terms of liability limitations, the 1992 Fund
currently offers up to 203 million SDR (283 million USD) in coverage for each oil
spill incident, which includes any compensation actually paid by or on behalf of a
ship owner under the 1992 CLC.61 The 1992 Fund is supported by contributions
from member state private parties who annually receive more than 150,000 metric
tons (mt) of “contributing oil.”62 This means accession to the 1992 Fund may be
associated with certain financial burdens. Thus, for the states whose “contributing
oil” is less than 150,000 mt, accession to the 1992 Fund, it “would appear only
advantageous and, therefore, highly advisable.”63
The 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol offers a third tier of compensation
in cases where the protection afforded under the 1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund
Convention is insufficient. The maximum amount of compensation available under
the 2003 Supplementary Fund is 750 million SDR (1.04 billion USD), which
includes any compensation paid under the 1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund. Similar to
the 1992 Fund, the 2003 Supplementary Fund is also financed by member state “oil
receivers,” but only those from member states deemed to have received at least 1
million mt of “contributing oil” per year.64 Since no accident has yet occurred and
been compensated by the Supplementary Fund, only a small amount of
administrative expense is currently levied on the member states of the
Supplementary Fund. Accordingly, the Supplementary Fund can guarantee
claimants sufficient compensation in the case of catastrophic oil spills, and

59. Id.
60. 1 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR SHIP-SOURCE OIL
POLLUTION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE
FROM TANKERS 16 (2012), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtltlb20114_en.pdf [https://perma.
cc/L8M5-SCEV].
61. See INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL
POLLUTION DAMAGE: TEXTS OF THE 1992 CIVIL LIABILITY CONVENTION, THE 1992 FUND CONVENTION
AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY FUND PROTOCOL 3, 24 (2011), http://www.iopcfunds.org/fileadmin/
IOPC_Upload/Downloads/English/Text_of_Conventions_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/A99L-S3QD].
62. See Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, supra note 10, 1953 U.N.T.S. at
377.
(3) ‘Contributing oil’ means crude oil and fuel oil as defined . . . below:
(a) ‘Crude Oil’ means any liquid hydrocarbon mixture occurring naturally in the earth
whether or not treated to render it suitable for transportation. It also includes crude
oils from which certain distillate fractions have been removed (sometimes referred to
as ‘topped crudes’) or to which certain distillate fractions have been added
(sometimes referred to as ‘spiked’ or ‘reconstituted’ crudes).
(b) ‘Fuel Oil’ means heavy distillates or residues from crude oil or blends of such
materials intended for use as a fuel for the production of heat or power of a quality
equivalent to the ‘American Society for Testing and Materials’ Specification for
Number Four Fuel Oil (Designation D 396-69)’, or heavier.
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil
Pollution Damage, supra note 2, 1110 U.N.T.S. at 60.
63. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., supra note 60, at 28.
64. Id. at 18.
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widespread adoption of the Supplementary Fund may reduce the financial burden
on each member state.
C. Liability and Compensation for Pollution from Offshore Operations
Although the 1992 CLC–IOPC regime offers a model of compensating oil
pollution, it does not apply to pollution from offshore oil and gas operations. Other
international conventions on liability and compensation for ship-source oil
pollution also do not cover oil spills in offshore extractive activities; offshore
accidents usually occur on offshore installations65 that are not generally considered
“ships” by definition. Only some offshore installations would be treated as ships,
but there is no uniform rule for the legal status of these installations under
international law.66
Practically speaking, the term “ship” is defined differently in various
international conventions with different purposes. 67 Some conventions, like the
1992 CLC and its Fund, provide the explicit criterion that a “ship” must have the
capacity to navigate at sea. 68 Accordingly, only those mobile installations that

65. See Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and
Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, May 1, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1451.
“Installation” means (a) any well or other facility, whether fixed or mobile, which is
used for the purpose of exploring for, producing, treating, storing, transmitting or
regaining control of the flow of crude oil from the seabed or its subsoil; (b) any well
which has been used for the purpose of exploring for, producing or regaining control
of the flow of crude oil from the seabed or its subsoil and which has been abandoned
after the entry into force of this Convention for the Controlling State concerned; (c)
any well which is used for the purpose of exploring for, producing or regaining
control of the flow of gas or natural gas liquids from the seabed or its subsoil during
the period that any such well is being drilled, including completion, or worked upon
except for normal maintenance operations; (d) any well which is used for the purpose
of exploring for any mineral resources other than crude oil, gas or natural gas liquids,
where such exploration involves the deep penetration of the subsoil of the seabed; and
(e) any facility which is normally used for storing crude oil from the seabed or its
subsoil; which, or a substantial part of which, is located seaward of the low-water line
along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the
Controlling State; provided, however, that (i) where a well or a number of wells is
directly connected to a platform or similar facility, the well or wells together with
such platform or facility shall constitute one installation; and (ii) a ship as defined in
the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done at
Brussels on 29 November 1969 shall not be considered to be an installation.
Id.
66. Mikhail Kashubsky, Protecting Offshore Oil and Gas Installations: Security Threats and
Countervailing Measures, J. OF ENERGY SECURITY, Dec. 11, 2013, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=476:protecting-offshore-oil-and-gas-installations-securitythreats-and-countervailing-measures&catid=140:energysecuritycontent&Itemid=429 [https://perma.cc/
PJ8J-TVDS].
67. Rosalie Balkin, Is There a Place for the Regulation of Offshore Oil Platforms Within
International Maritime Law? If Not, Then Where?, DUBLIN SYMP. (2013) (presented Sept. 30, 2013).
68. See Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, supra note 10, 1956 U.N.T.S. at 285.
“Ship” means any sea-going vessel and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever
constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, provided that a ship
capable of carrying oil and other cargoes shall be regarded as ship only when it is
actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo and during any voyage following such carriage
unless it is proved that it has no residues of such carriage of oil in bulk aboard.
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“have [their] own independent motive power and steering equipment for seagoing
navigation, and are employed either as storage units or for carriage of oil in bulk as
cargo,” would be classified as ships under the CLC–Funds definitions. 69 Others
such as the Bunker Convention and the HNS Convention define “ship” simply as
“any seagoing vessel and seaborne craft, of any type whatsoever.” Although this
definition could potentially be interpreted broadly enough to cover both mobile and
fixed oil installations, and thereby trigger a duty to obtain insurance for those
installations,70 it remains difficult to apply the compensation mechanism for shipsource oil spills to offshore oil spills based on the distinct characteristics of
offshore installations and ships. In practice, there have been no offshore installation
oil spills compensated under the IMO Civil Liability and Fund conventions.
Although a series of international legal practices for oil pollution in
offshore extractive activities have developed since the 1970s, few conventions
effectively establish an international liability and compensation regime for offshore
oil accidents (see Table 2 below). Due to different levels of development in the
offshore oil and gas industry around the world, as well as different interests among
countries, regulations applicable to offshore accidents tend to come in the form of
contracts or regional agreements. Although they serve an important function in
promoting and ensuring regional offshore oil and gas safety, it is not ideal to have
different legal regimes for individual countries. For example, under different
regimes, offshore installations could fall under the definition of “ships” in one
jurisdiction and “independent drilling units” in another; and the ceiling for an
offshore installation operator’s liability for accidental spills may be limited in one
country and unlimited in another. As a result, unification of definitions and legal
mechanisms must be addressed “before the various regions of the world develop
incompatible legal and liability regimes.”71

Id.
69. Balkin, supra note 67.
70. Id.
71. Edgar Gold, Pollution from Offshore Activities-An Overview of the Operational, Legal and
Environmental Aspects, in LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 203–232, 224
(Colin M. De La Rue ed. 1993).

Summer 2017

LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL SPILLS

479

TABLE 2. Legal practices on international convention for oil pollution in offshore extractive
activities
Convention

Legal Aspects

The Offshore
Pollution Liability
Agreement (OPOL),
1974

The OPOL is a private agreement initially applied to offshore
72
facilities within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, but has
subsequently been extended to apply to such facilities within the
73
jurisdiction of other countries as well. It covers oil discharges
from offshore facilities within the jurisdiction of any state that is
specified in OPOL, and participating states now require applicants
for offshore exploration, exploitation, and pipe-laying licenses to be
74
a party to OPOL. In terms of compensation, the OPOL
establishes a current maximum of 250 million USD per incident,
subject to a few exceptions, for pollution damage and the cost of
75
remedial measures incurred. Each operator should accept strict
liability.

Convention on Civil
Liability for Pollution
Damage Resulting
from Exploration for
and Exploitation of
Seabed Mineral
Resources (CLEE),
1977

The CLEE was an attempt at establishing a separate liability
regime for the offshore oil and gas industry. It provides detailed
rules concerning the standards of liability (strict or fault), limitations
76
of liability (limited or unlimited), and jurisdiction, referring to
“installations” that covers all fixed or mobile units, storage
77
installations and most pipelines. Unfortunately, this instrument
has never achieved the necessary ratifications for entry into
78
force, but offers a useful model on liability for offshore oil
pollution to study and optimize.

72. OFFSHORE POLLUTION LIAB. ASS’N LTD., OFFSHORE POLLUTION LIABILITY AGREEMENT 2
(2016), http://www.opol.org.uk/downloads/OPOL_Agreement%20-%201_April_2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CGX3-FH5K]
“Offshore facility” means (a) any well and any installation or pipeline or portion
thereof of any kind, fixed or mobile, being used for the purpose of exploring for,
producing, treating, storing or transporting Oil from the seabed or its subsoil; (b) any
well used for the purpose of exploring for or recovering gas or natural gas liquids
from the seabed or its subsoil during the period that any such well is being drilled
(including completion), re-completed or worked upon (except for normal work-over
operations); or (c) any installation of any kind, fixed or mobile, intended for the
purpose of exploring for, producing, treating or storing Oil from the seabed or its
subsoil where such installation has been temporarily removed from its operational site
for whatever reason.
Id.
73. See The Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL), OFFSHORE POLLUTION LIAB. ASS’N
LTD. 2 (2016), http://www.opol.org.uk/about-1.htm [https://perma.cc/5BRN-R9GJ]. Until July 1, 2016,
the OPOL applied to the offshore facilities in Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the
Republic of Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, the Isle of Man, the Faroe Islands, and Greenland, but
excluding such facilities located in the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas. It can be extended to apply to
offshore facilities within the jurisdiction of any other state. Id.
74. See OFFSHORE POLLUTION LIAB. ASS’N LTD., supra note 72, at 6.
75. Offshore Pollution Liab. Ass’n Ltd., OPOL: Guidelines for Claimants, http://www.opol.org.uk/
downloads/opol-guidelines-oct10.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V4V-JUU8].
76. Gold, supra note 71, at 221.
77. See Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and
Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, supra note 65.
78. Richard Shaw, Regulation of Offshore Activity-Pollution Liability and Other Aspects, in
COMITÉ MAR. INT’L, YEARBOOK 2011–2012 ANNUAIRE: BEIJING I DOCUMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE
302 (2012).
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Convention

Legal Aspects

CMI Draft
Convention on
Offshore Mobile
79
Craft, 1977

The CMI draft convention, also known as the Rio Draft, constituted
80
a model of incorporation by reference, but initially could not form
81
“a practical regime suitable for offshore units.” The convention
82,
was later revised in 1994, then accepted by the CMI. This
instrument became known as the Sydney Draft. Notwithstanding
83
the creation of the Sydney Draft, the International Association of
Drilling Contractors and the United States Maritime Law
Association insisted that a comprehensive international treaty for
84
oil installations was not necessary. This led to the striking of
Sydney Draft from the IMO long-term working plan. However,
although establishment of an international convention for offshore
installations had been officially ceased, a CMI working group and
the Canadian Maritime Law Association developed the Draft
Convention on Offshore Units, Artificial Islands and Related
Structures Used in the Exploration for and Exploitation of
Petroleum and Seabed Mineral Resources 2001, i.e., the
Canadian Draft, which provides for comprehensive coverage for of
oil installations, including “property, registration, privileges,
mortgages, civil and penal jurisdiction to salvage, pollution and
85
liability for leakage.” At the 2004 CMI Conference in Vancouver,
this draft convention received overall support despite continued
strong opposition from the United States; and participants of the
conference agreed to continue to work towards improving this
86
instrument.

79. Comité Maritime International, Draft International Convention on Off-Shore Mobile Craft, in
COMITÉ MAR. INT’L, HANDBOOK OF MARITIME CONVENTIONS (2004), http://www.gbv.de/dms/spk/sbb/
toc/390092681.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF5E-UP8A]. The CMI 1977 Draft Convention on Offshore
Mobile Craft (the Rio draft), not in force.
80. Among the problems sought to be addressed by the original Rio Draft were unclear definitions
of the term “ship” and disordered practices in applying the term to “offshore units”. See Michael White,
Offshore Craft and Structures: A Proposed International Convention, 18 AUSTL. MINING &
PETROLEUM L.J. 21, 22 (1999).
81. Canadian Mar. Law Ass’n, The Origins of the CMLA Draft Convention on Offshore Units,
Artificial Islands and Related Structures Used in the Exploration for and Exploitation of Petroleum and
Seabed Mineral Resources, CMI NEWS LETTER (Comité Maritime International), Jan./Apr. 2004, at 1, 2,
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Newsletters/2004/Binder1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MMM8SX64].
82. Article 1 of the Comité Maritime International (CMI) Constitution provides that the CMI “is a
non-governmental not-for-profit international organization established in Antwerp in 1897, the object of
which is to contribute by all appropriate means and activities to the unification of maritime law in all its
aspects.”
83. Comité Maritime International, Draft Convention on Off-Shore Mobile Craft (1994), reprinted
in 1994 CMI Y.B. 180, http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Yearbooks/1994%20YEARBOOKANNUAIRE%20SYDNEY%20II.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6ZW-XYZ8].
84. Jacqueline Allen, A Global Oil Stain – Cleaning Up International Conventions for Liability and
Compensation for Oil Exploration/Production, 25 AUSTL. & N.Z. MAR. L.J. 90, 91 (2011).
85. Iberoamerican Institute of Maritime Law, Position Paper of the Iberoamerican Institute of
Maritime Law in Relation to the Need of an International Convention on the Offshore Extractive
Activity Promoted by the IMO, Agenda Item 11 of the 102nd Session of the CMI Legal Committee (Apr.
14, 2015) [hereinafter Position Paper], reprinted in 2015 CMI Y.B. 184, 186 http://www.comite
maritime.org/Uploads/Yearbooks/CMI_Yearbook_2015%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LFK-TFKL].
86. Allen, supra note 84, at 91.
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The UNCLOS provides a fruitful framework for future development,
rather than an operational treaty on liability and compensation for
88
offshore oil spill damages. In particular, article 194(3) calls upon
member states to take measures to minimize the “pollution from
installations and devices used in exploration or exploitation of the
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, in particular
measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies,
ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and regulating the design,
construction, equipment, operation and manning of such
installations or devices.” Article 208 additionally encourages
member states to “cooperate in the implementation of existing
international law and further development of international law
relating to responsibility and liability for the assessment of and
compensation for damage and the settlement of related disputes.”

In effect, liability and compensation for offshore oil accidents are not
strictly legal problems, but also relate to a political issue: “[s]tates do not [wish to
relinquish] their sovereignty over [c]ontinental [s]helves and [EEZs] and resist
[subscribing] to an international convention [regarding those offshore extraction
activities because] they understand [international law] may limit [their]
jurisdictional [authority].” 89 However, as the risk of offshore oil spill accidents
increases, a unified international regime is likely to be the most effective method
for providing adequate and fair compensation for oil pollution damages of member
states. One reason for this is that offshore oil and gas facilities are usually operated
by multinational corporations, a situation which presents complications in stating
claims for compensation when oil spill accidents occur. For example, in developing
countries, ineffectively structured international and national regulations not only
aggravate damages for victims in the event of an oil spill accident, but also allow
multinational oil and gas corporations to profit without taking responsibility for oil
pollution. Another reason an international regime is necessary is that offshore
accidents can easily cause transboundary pollution; and without a unified liability
and compensation regime, applicable laws may conflict inter se involved states.
Furthermore, with offshore extractive industries expanding their activities to the
high seas and polar areas, international regulations will be of particular importance
in preventing and controlling the potential risks of offshore oil accidents in those
common areas of the world not within any one country’s exclusive jurisdiction. All
these considerations together demonstrate that an international convention
addressing offshore extractive activities should be promoted and introduced to the
IMO’s agenda.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY AND
COMPENSATION REGIME FOR OIL SPILL ACCIDENTS IN CHINA
Worldwide, coastal states may be divided into three categories based on
the compensation regimes they have adopted in the face of marine oil pollution. In
the first category are the majority of coastal states, which have fully adopted the
1992 CLC–IOPC funds regime, South Korea and Japan being notable examples.
87. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 9.
88. Gold, supra note 71, at 224.
89. Position Paper, supra note 85, at 9.
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These states deal with oil spill accidents based on international conventions without
regard to whether the accidents involve domestic or non-domestic tankers. The
second category includes states that fully rely on domestic law, without taking part
in any international convention. 90 For instance, the United States applies a
unilateral approach to the compensation for oil pollution. Compared with the 1992
CLC–IOPC funds regime, the United States’ regime provides substantially
unlimited liability, and recognizes broader compensation for natural resources
damages.91 States in the third category adopt a regime combining international and
domestic legal frameworks, such as Canada and China. Under this approach,
international conventions and domestic regulations are likely to complement each
other, which accords with the rule of the United Nations Convention of the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS):
States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance with
their legal systems for prompt and adequate compensation or
other relief in respect of damage caused by pollution of the
marine environment by natural or juridical persons under their
jurisdiction.92
A. Overview of the Chinese Regime on Liability and Compensation for Oil
Pollution
Presently, the Chinese regime concerning liability and compensation for
oil pollution adopts the double mechanism approach. On one hand, China has fully
acceded to the 1992 CLC and the Bunker Convention, but only applied the 1992
Fund to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. According to the general
principles of Chinese law (see Table 3 below), international treaties are applied
with priority when they contain provisions that differ from domestic regulations.93
On the other hand, a domestic liability fund regime can be applied to ship-source
oil pollution when the pollution damage cannot be compensated under the
international regime. China has also selectively assimilated certain rules of CLC–
IOPC Funds into its domestic liability-fund regime, but the compensation criteria is
far lower than the criteria established in the CLC–IOPC Funds regime. In terms of
oil pollution from offshore operations, China has neither adopted an international
convention nor enacted domestic legislation that would create a unified liability
and compensation system. Some Chinese laws, such as the Marine Environmental
Protection Law and Tort Law, provide fundamental principles on liability and
compensation for oil pollution, which can apply to offshore oil spill damage, but

90. Peng Zhang et al., Compensation for the Damages Arising from Oil Spill Incidents: Legislation
Infrastructure and Characteristics of the Chinese Regime, 140 ESTUARINE, COASTAL & SHELF SCI. 76,
77 (2014).
91. See Inho Kim, A Comparison Between the International and US Regimes Regulating Oil
Pollution Liability and Compensation, 27 MARINE POL’Y 265, 271 (2003).
92. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 9, at 494.
93. See General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted by the
Fourth Session of the Sixth National People’s Congress; Aug. 12, 1986, amended on Aug. 27, 2009),
art. 142, http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=2780 [https://perma.cc/7FV39QE5].
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these principles are too general to explicitly direct liability to responsible parties.94
As a result, adjudication of compensation for offshore oil spill accidents occurs
mainly through administrative mediation in China.
TABLE 3. Chinese laws and regulations related to the liability and compensation for oil
spill accidents
95

Legislation

Category

Year

General legal principles
related to the liability and
compensation for oil
pollution

2014

Environmental Protection Law of the People’s
Republic of China (EPL)

2013

Marine Environmental Protection Law of the
People’s Republic of China (MEPL)
Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China
General Principles Of the Civil Law of the People’s
Republic Of China
Measures of the People’s Republic of China for the
Implementation of Civil Liability Insurance for
Vessel-induced Oil Pollution Damage (Insurance
Implementation Measures)
Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the
Administrative Measures for the Collection and Use
of Compensation Funds for Vessel-Induced Oil
Pollution Damage
Administrative Measures for the Collection and Use
of Compensation Funds for Vessel-Induced Oil
Pollution Damage
Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on
Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases of
Disputes over Compensation for Vessel-induced
Oil Pollution Damage (the 2011 Judicial
Interpretation)

2009
2009
Special laws related to
the liability and
compensation for shipsource oil spills

2013

2012

2012

2011

2010

2009

1992
Special laws related to
the liability and
compensation for
offshore oil spills

2017

2016

2011

Administrative Provisions of the People’s Republic
of China on the Prevention and Control of Marine
Environmental Pollution by Vessels and Their
Operations
Regulation on the Prevention and Control of
Vessel-induced Pollution to the Marine
Environment (Prevention Regulation)
Maritime Law of the People’s Republic of China
Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on
the Administration of Environmental Protection for
Offshore Oil Exploration and Exploitation
Measures for the Implementation of the Regulation
of the People’s Republic of China on the
Administration of Environmental Protection for
Offshore Oil Exploration and Exploitation
Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on
the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources
in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises

94. See Michael G. Faure & Liu Jing, Compensation for Environmental Damage in China: Theory
and Practice, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 226, 304 (2014).
95. The year of the latest revision of the laws and regulations.
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B. Implementation of the International Liability Regime for Ship-source Oil
Pollution in China
As a signatory of the 1992 CLC and Bunker Convention, China has
confirmed the applicability of the 1992 CLC to persistent oil spill accidents caused
by tankers as long as the pollution damages occur within China’s territory and
EEZs. 96 Meanwhile, non-persistent oil spills caused by oil tankers or oil spills
caused by non-oil tankers are to be settled according to the Maritime Law.97 Since
the Bunker Convention does not have an independent limitation of liability or
exclusive funds available to compensate bunker oil pollutions, the Chinese liability
regime incorporated rules from the Bunker Convention into its domestic
regulations for bunker oil pollutions (see Table 4 below). According to Article 5 of
the 2011 Judicial Interpretation:
If oil pollution damage is done due to the persistent oil carried by
oil tankers, the limits of liability shall be determined according to
the Regulation on the Prevention and Control of Vessel-induced
Pollution to the Marine Environment and the International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1992).
If oil pollution damage is caused by non-persistent bunker oil
carried by oil tankers or by bunker oil carried by vessels other
than oil tankers, the limits of liability shall be determined
according to the provisions of the Maritime Law on the limits of
liability for maritime claims.98
TABLE 4. Applicable law for different types of oil pollution in China
Applicable Limitation of
Ships
Types Oil Pollution
Applicable Law
Liability
Persistent oil as cargo
1992 CLC
1992 CLC
Ships
under the
Persistent bunker oil
1992 CLC
1992 CLC
1992
CLC (oil Non-persistent
oil
as Prevention
Maritime Law
tankers)
cargo
Regulation
Ships not
under the
1992
CLC
(non-oil
tankers)

Non-persistent bunker oil

Bunker Convention

Maritime Law

Persistent oil as cargo

---

---

Persistent bunker oil

Bunker Convention

Maritime Law

Non-persistent
oil
as
cargo
Non-persistent bunker oil

Prevention
Regulation
Bunker Convention

Maritime Law
Maritime Law

96. The territory includes the territorial sea. See Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, supra note 10, at art. 3.
97. See Maritime Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted by the 28th Meeting of the
Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s Congress, Nov. 7, 1992, in force July 1, 1993),
art. 208.2, http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=6023 [https://perma.cc/WS5GB63D].
98. Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases of
Disputes over Compensation for Vessel-induced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by the 1509th
meeting of the Judicial Comm. of the Sup. People’s Ct., May 4, 2011, in force July 1, 2011), art. 5.
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Similar to the 1992 CLC, China’s Maritime Law also adopts a strict
liability principle, exempting only damages resulting “from war, natural disaster,
the negligence of public authorities in maintaining lights or other navigational aids,
and either the sabotage or wrongful acts of the third party.”99 The limitation of
liability is also established according to the gross tonnage of the ship, and is
divided into the categories of personal injury compensation and non-personal injury
compensation (see Table 5 below).100 Notably, domestic limitation of liability for
oil pollution established by the Maritime Law is significantly lower than that of the
1992 CLC. As a result, for those non-persistent bunker oil spills or bunker oil spills
caused by non-oil tankers in China, domestic limitation of liability insufficiently
compensates economic loss as well as environmental damage, and urgently needs
improvement via amendment to the Maritime Law.
Further, to guarantee the financial security of ship owners, China has
established a compulsory insurance system (see Table 5 below). The system,
together with liability rules, constitutes the first tier of compensation for oil
pollution. According to Insurance Implementation Measures,
for the vessels carrying oil substances and vessels carrying nonoil substances with a gross tonnage of not less than 1,000 gross
tons which are navigating within the sea areas of the People’s
Republic of China, the owners thereof shall buy civil liability
insurance for vessel-induced oil pollution damage or obtain
corresponding financial guarantee in accordance with these
Measures.101
Consistent with the Prevention Regulation, this rule confirms the
insurance requirement for owners for three types of ships: those carrying as bulk
cargo either (1) persistent or (2) non-persistent oil, or (3) more than 1,000 gross
tons of non-oil substances.102 Compared with the 2,000 ton persistent oil carriage
requirement under the 1992 CLC, China’s domestic oil pollution insurance
provision actually provides a stricter standard for the shipping industry.
Furthermore, the domestic minimum insurance is set at no less than the insurance
criteria for oil pollution in the Maritime Law and the 1992 CLC, respectively.103
This high standard insurance may increase the cost of shipping, but in the long term
it will tend to eliminate ineffectively managed oil ships and reduce the risks of
ship-source oil pollution.

99. Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Vessel-Induced
Marine Environment Pollution (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 9,
2009, effective Mar. 1, 2010), art. 51.
100. Peng Zhang et al., supra note 90, at 78.
101. Measures of the People’s Republic of China for the Implementation of Civil Liability Insurance
for Vessel-induced Oil Pollution Damage (Ministry of Transport of the People’s Republic of China,
Aug. 19, 2010, amended on Aug. 31, 2013, in force Aug. 31, 2013), at art. 2.
102. Id. at art. 4.
103. Compare id. at arts. 5, 6 with Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, art. 6, supra note 10, at 285–86.
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TABLE 5. Liability limitation comparison between the 1992 CLC-IOPC Funds regime and
the Chinese regime
Tier

1992 CLC-Funds Regime

Chinese Regime

First

Injury

Personal Injury

(a) ≦ 5000 GT, 4.51 million SDR

20–21 GT, 54000 SDR

(b) 5000—140000 GT, 4.51
million SDR plus
(c) > 140000 GT, 89.77 million
SDR

> 21 GT, 54000 SDR plus 1000 SDR for
each GT
300–500 GT, 333000 SDR
501–3000 GT, 333000 SDR plus 500 SDR
for each GT
3001–30000 GT, SDR3000 GT plus 333 SDR
for each GT
30001–70000 GT, SDR30000 GT plus 250
SDR for each GT
> 70000 GT, SDR70000 GT plus 167 SDR
for each GT
Non-personal injury
20–21 GT 27500 SDR; 21–300 GT, 27500
SDR plus 500 SDR for each GT
300–500 GT, 167000 SDR for each GT

Insurance
For ships carrying more than
2000 tonnes of oil as cargo in
bulk, the shipowner is obliged to
maintain insurance to cover his
liability under the 1992 CLC, and
claimants have a right of direct
104,
action against the insurer.

501–30000 GT, 167000 SDR 167 SDR for
each GT
30000–70000 GT, SDR30000 GT plus 125
SDR for each GT
70000 GT, SDR70000 GT plus 83 SDR for
each GT
Insurance
Vessels carrying persistent oil substances:
≦ 5000 GT, 4.51 million SDR
> 5000 GT, 4.51 million SDR plus 631
SDR for each GT, no more than 89.77
million SDR
Vessels carrying non-persistent oil
substances:
20–21 GT 27500 SDR
21–300 GT, 27500 SDR plus 500 SDR for
each GT
300–500 GT, 167000 SDR for each GT
501–30000 GT, 167000 SDR 167 SDR for
each GT
30000–70000 GT, SDR30000 GT plus 125
SDR for each GT
> 70000 GT, SDR70000 GT plus 83 SDR
for each GT

104. Legal Framework of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, INT’L OIL POLLUTION FUNDS [IOPC
FUNDS], http://www.iopcfunds.org/about-us/legal-framework/1992-civil-liability-convention/ [https://
perma.cc/R75J-5S5U].
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Second

203 million SDR

30 million CNY (3.4 million SDR)

Third

750 million SDR

---

487
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C. The Implementation of the IOPC Funds and its Challenges in China
Taking into consideration the heavy contributions levied by the IOPC
Funds and the limited financial ability of domestic ship owners, China has now
adopted the 1992 Funds only in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. As
China has become the largest global net importer of crude oil in recent years,106 the
risk of spills in its oil shipping has also necessarily increased. As potential loss
magnitude of losses rises along with this increased risk, China should fully accept
the international Funds for oil pollution to assure sufficient compensation in the
event an oil spill accident occurs.
Nonetheless, many oil ships in China operate in marginal situations, from
the standpoint of the current compensation regime. For example, some ships that
transport less than 1,000 gross tons of oil do not have oil spill insurance and
operate in a grey area in terms of potential liability as these ships cannot apply the
Insurance Implementation Measures. 107 Other Chinese ships are designed with
single-layer hulls, which are more likely than double-layer hulls to leak oil in lowimpact collisions and groundings. These factors illustrate that a significant portion
of the Chinese shipping industry currently cannot afford the contributions required
by the IOPC Funds and thus needs reform.
While a domestic fund for compensating ship-source oil pollution has
been created as a second tier of compensation in China, since 1999, the Marine
Environment Protection Law (MEPL) 108 has provided the legal authority for
establishing such a fund. The law states:
[t]he State shall perfect and put into practice the civil liability
system of compensation for vessel-induced oil pollution, and
shall establish a fund system for vessel-induced oil pollution
insurance and oil pollution compensation based on the principle

105. The 1992 Funds Convention applies to Hong Kong. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Ref.
B1/D/3.03 IFC.4/Circ.34, Accession by China to the Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage,
1971 (Jan. 14, 1999) (noting China’s declaration that the Protocol would “be applicable only to the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”).
106. See Candace Dunn, China is Now the World’s Largest Net Importer of Petroleum and Other
Liquid Fuels, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.
php?id=15531 [https://perma.cc/JMK9-Y3PG]
107. Measures of the People’s Republic of China for the Implementation of Civil Liability Insurance
for Vessel-induced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by Ministry of Transp. of the People’s Republic
of China, Aug. 19, 2010, rev’d Aug. 31, 2013, effective Aug. 31, 2013), art. 2.
108. See supra note 13.

488

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 57

of the vessel and cargo owners jointly undertaking the risks of
any vessel-induced oil pollution compensation liability.109
In 2010, the Prevention Regulation also proposed a basic framework for
such a domestic compensation fund, providing that the fund would be operated by
the government and oil receivers. 110 Accordingly, China issued Administrative
Measures111 in 2012 which, together with Detailed Rules,112 provide guidance for
the fund levy. Finally, in June 2015, a Fund Management Committee 113 was
established to administer the compensation mechanism for vessel-induced oil
pollution. 114 Responsible for decision-making, the Fund Executive Committee is
comprised of nine relevant government agencies. 115 A Claim Affairs Center
independently enforces the Committee’s compensation decisions.
Similar to the IOPC Funds, the domestic fund was also established with
the purpose of providing additional compensation for ship-source oil spill damage,
while balancing the financial burden between Chinese ship owners and oil
receivers. The provisions of the Administrative Measures are nearly identical their
IOPC Funds counterparts. While the domestic fund provides compensation for
ship-source oil pollution, its first priority is covering emergency disposal of oil
pollution, 116 which is not reflected in the 1992 CLC–IOPC Funds regime.
According to the Administrative Measures, the Fund Executive Committee levies

109. Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, rev’d Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000), art.
66.
110. Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Vessel-Induced
Marine Environment Pollution (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 9,
2009, effective Mar. 1, 2010), art. 56.
111. Administrative Measures for the Collection and Use of Compensation Funds for VesselInduced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin. and the Ministry of Transp. of the
People’s Republic of China, May 11, 2012, effective July 1, 2012).
112. Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Administrative Measures for the Collection and
Use of Compensation Funds for Vessel-Induced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by the Ministry of
Fin. and the Ministry of Transp. of the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 16, 2014, effective Apr. 16,
2014).
113. The Executive Committee is composed of the Ministry of Transport of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC), Ministry of Finance of the PRC, Ministry of Agriculture of the PRC, Ministry of
Environmental Protection of the PRC, State Oceanic Administration of the PRC, China National
Tourism Administration, China National Petroleum Corporation, China Petrochemical Corporation
(Sinopec Group), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC).
114. Maritime Bureau, supra note 11.
115. The nine units include six administrative organs of the People’s Republic of China: Ministry of
Transport, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Environmental Protection, State
Oceanic Administration, National Tourism Administration, and three oil receivers: National Petroleum
Corporation, China Sinopec, China National Offshore Oil Corporation. See China Launched a New Ship
Oil Pollution Damage Compensation Mechanism, SHANDONG PROVINCE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION PORT AUTHORITY, http://sdsghj.com/ghwwmh/index/info/infoDetail.jsp?messageId=
000043000228&directoryId=000043 [https://perma.cc/R6WG-HBAT].
116. Administrative Measures for the Collection and Use of Compensation Funds for VesselInduced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin. and the Ministry of Transp. of the
People’s Republic of China, May 11, 2012, effective July 1, 2012), art. 17.
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0.3 CNY (0.05 USD)117 per ton of persistent oil products from oil receivers or their
agents.118 From July 1, 2012 to May 30, 2015, approximately 1,660 million CNY
(25 million USD) was levied, which could compensate fourteen oil spill accidents,
as estimated and calculated by the Chinese government.119 Because the domestic
fund is in an early stage of operation, compensation associated with certain criteria
is much lower than for the IOPC Funds; the highest compensation amount for each
accident is only 30 million CNY (4.5 million USD).120 In July 2016, two Claims
Guidelines121 were issued for claimants and specific claims work, respectively.122
By offering detailed procedures for claiming funds, the Guidelines may improve
fairness and efficiency in compensating ship-source oil pollution damage; however,
these Claims Guidelines are not considered to be the legal basis for claiming funds
when a court hears specific cases.
D. Liability and Compensation for Offshore Oil Spill Accidents in China
In attempting to create working definitions for offshore installations, both
the Chinese Maritime Code and 2011 Judicial Interpretation incorporate “offshore
mobile units” into the definition of “ships.” 123 This indicates that not only seagoing vessels, but also sea-mobile units such as floating drilling platforms,
hovercrafts, and seaplanes may trigger application of the liability rules for shipsource oil pollution. However, major offshore accidents usually occur on fixed
drilling platforms, but China lacks the relevant liability and compensation and the
ship-source oil pollution regime cannot be applied.
Domestic legislation covering civil liability for offshore oil spill accidents
is scarce. However, a fundamental Chinese regulation concerning pollution damage
in the MEPL provides:

117. This exchange rate is as of February 1, 2017, from the statistics of China State Administration
of Foreign Exchange, 1CNY=1US$0.1459). See Central Parity of RMB Exchange Rate, STATE ADMIN.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE, http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/sy/tjsj_hlzjj_inquire [https://perma.cc/997WS25Q].
118. Administrative Measures for the Collection and Use of Compensation Funds for VesselInduced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin. and the Ministry of Transp. of the
People’s Republic of China, May 11, 2012, effective July 1, 2012), arts. 17, 6.
119. See Maritime Bureau, supra note 11.
120. Administrative Measures for the Collection and Use of Compensation Funds for VesselInduced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin. and the Ministry of Transp. of the
People’s Republic of China, May 11, 2012, effective July 1, 2012), arts. 17, 18.
121. Claim Guidelines of Compensation Funds for Vessel-Induced Oil Pollution Damage (Trial
Version) (promulgated by the Mar, Safety Admin. of the Ministry of Transp. of the People’s Republic of
China, July 2016) (applied to accidents having occurred since the July 1, 2012).
122. MINISTRY TRANSP. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA, SHIP OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUND
CLAIMS MORE CONVENIENT CLAIMS MORE TRANSPARENT (2016), http://www.moc.gov.cn/jiaotongyao
wen/201606/t20160617_2045189.html [https://perma.cc/YH37-6FBK].
123. See Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 28th Meeting of the
Standing Committee of the Seventh Nat’l People’s Congr., Nov. 7, 1992, effective July 1, 1993), art. 3;
see also Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases of
Disputes over Compensation for Vessel-induced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by the 1509th
meeting of the Judicial Comm. of the Supr. People’s Ct., May 4, 2011, effective July 1, 2011), art. 31.1.
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Any party that is directly responsible for a pollution damage to
the marine environment shall relieve the damage and compensate
for the losses; in case the pollution damage to the marine
environment is entirely caused by an intentional act or a fault of a
third party, that third party shall relieve the damage and be liable
for the compensation.124
Accordingly, a polluter is subjected to fault-based liability for marine oil
pollution, and there is no limitation of liability for the pollution damage. While the
Tort Law establishes strict liability for environmental pollution “[w]here any harm
is caused by environmental pollution for the fault of a third party, the victim may
require a compensation from either the polluter or the third party. After making
compensation, the polluter shall be entitled to be reimbursed by the third party.”125
This state of the law presumably creates a conflict in laws, i.e., that offshore oil
spill damage could trigger either fault-based liability or strict liability. Moreover,
the MEPL and the Tort Law do not specifically define “polluter” and “responsible
party,” which leads to ambiguity regarding who is subject to liability for oil spills.
Like ship owners, each enterprise, institution, or operator of an offshore
oil and gas installation registered in China is also required to carry insurance or
other financial guaranties with respect to liabilities for pollution damage. 126
However, under the Chinese regime, there is no funding mechanism to supplement
compensation for pollution from offshore operations.127 The domestic Chinese oil
pollution fund currently only provides compensation for ship-source oil spills,
which, together with the IOPC Funds, cannot be applied to offshore oil spill
damage.
Due to the lack of a unified liability and compensation criteria for offshore
accidents, oil pollution from offshore operations in China is more likely to be
compensated through administrative mediation, as opposed to civil litigation. 128
According to the MEPL, the State Oceanic Administration of PRC (OSA) is
responsible for “the supervision and control over the marine environment, organize
survey, surveillance, supervision, assessment and scientific research of the marine
environment” and “the nation-wide environment protection work in preventing and
controlling marine pollution damages caused by marine construction projects and
dumping of wastes in the sea.” 129 The OSA is also in charge of claiming
124. See Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, rev’d Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000),
art. 90.
125. See Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Dec. 26 2009, effective July 1, 2010), art. 68.
126. Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Environmental
Protection for Offshore Oil Exploration and Exploitation (promulgated by the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, Dec. 29, 1983, effective Dec, 29, 1983), art. 9.
127. Lina Zhang, Comparative Study on Compulsory Insurance of Oil Pollution by Marine Oil
Development and by Ships, 149 J. HENAN U. ECON. & L. 31, 35 (2015).
128. Hui Wang & Wei Zhao, Probe on Tort Liability for the Pollution Damage from Offshore Oil
and Gas Operations, 215 J. STUDY & EXPLORATION 60, 61 (2013).
129. See Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, rev’d Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000),
art. 5.
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entitlement to compensation, on behalf of the State of China, from polluters for oil
spill damage. 130 Further, the MEPL provides a maximum fine of 200,000 CNY
(approximately 29,000 USD) per marine environmental accident, 131 which is
extremely inadequate for offshore oil spill accidents. In addition, the MEPL
imposes criminal liability on responsible parties for “any accident that causes major
marine environment pollution and results thus in grave consequences of heavy
losses in public and private properties or in injury and death of persons.” 132
Offenses such as “Negligently Causing Serious Accident Crime” and “Taking Risk
Work Crime” in the Criminal Law of PRC 133 can be charged against parties
responsible for offshore oil spill damage.134 However, although responsible parties
may face criminal punishment, criminal law only been implemented in a few
instances to deal with oil pollution caused by offshore oil and gas operations.135
CONCLUSION
The international regime on liability and compensation for oil pollution
consists of a series of IMO Civil Liability and Fund conventions. The regime
operates stably and effectively in compensating ship-source oil pollution, but does
not address pollution damage caused by offshore operations. Some private laws and
regional agreements have provided liability and compensation mechanisms for
offshore pollution damage. However, different state regimes have different criteria
concerning the definitions of offshore installations, limitation of liability,
compulsory insurance, as well as additional funds. With offshore drilling activities
on the rise worldwide and increasingly moving into deeper seas, it is increasingly
necessary for the world community to establish a unified regime for assigning
liability and providing compensation to injured parties as a result of offshore oil
spill damage, especially for the countries lacking domestic compensation
mechanisms for these accidents.
China is experiencing a transitional phase of improving liability and
compensation for oil pollution. In the face of ship-source oil pollution, China has
fully implemented the 1992 CLC and Bunker Convention, and established
domestic liability and fund rules as a supplementary regime. The combined system
provides two tiers of compensation for oil pollution. However, compensation under
China’s domestic liability-fund regime is potentially much lower than the
compensation available under international civil liability conventions. For oil
pollution from offshore operations, Chinese law only offers general rules on
liability and compensation that are fragmented and contain internal conflicts in
terms of definitions and the scope of liability for oil and gas installation owners and

130. See id. art. 90.
131. See id. art. 91.
132. See id.
133. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 12th Nat’l People’s
Congr. of the People’s Republic of China, Aug. 29, 2015, effective Nov. 1, 2015), Amendment IX; The
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, promulgated by Standing Comm. of the 5th Nat’l
People’s Congr., July 1, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980).
134. Wang & Zhao, supra note 128, at 63.
135. Id.
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operators. Overall, a liability-fund regime for ship-source oil pollution with a
higher ceiling of compensation is urgently needed in China. And such a fund
should establish criteria for compensation not less than the criteria for the 1992
CLC–IOPC Funds.
As the financial capability of Chinese ship owners improves, China should
endeavor to fully implement the 1992 IOPC Funds regime, which requires certain
monetary contributions from any qualified oil receivers136 of member states, but
offers more comprehensive compensation for serious oil spill accidents. In
addition, the Chinese domestic liability-fund regime for oil pollution must be
extended to the pollution damage caused by offshore accidents. Finally, a fully
actualized, unified liability and compensation regime in China—that provides for
compensation for offshore accidents—will also almost certainly include binding
liability and compensation criteria, as well as safety regulations for offshore
extractive activities worldwide.

136. See discussion supra Part III.B.

